(Author’s Note: This article was originally written over a year ago. Today the figure used is that ISIS now controls 200 square miles of territory. But the author believes that denial of territory is important but it should not be a measure of victory or defeat.)
Mission accomplished.
AQ is on the run.
ISIS is defeated.
ISIS is on the run.
The Homeland is safe. They can’t plan a 9/11 type of attack.
ISIS is giving up.
“The ISIS dream of a Caliphate is over…”
Want proof? “In January, 2017 ISIS controlled 23,300 square miles. Today it holds onto about 9,300 square miles.”
To believe any of the above statements implies we are winning a war that will put an end to terrorism. We are not. So, what is missing in in our evaluation of victory? Believing these and other optimistic declarations of victory is to consider only geography or territory held, that is only a small part of the strategic picture. To make the narrative even worse, words like franchises, off-shoots, decentralized jihad, AQ/ISIS affiliates and the ever-present “lone wolf” are descriptions currently used interchangeably in our modern lexicon. They are either designed to give our western mind a logical structure of the enemy we face or the descriptions are used because those prosecuting the fight don’t understand the true nature of the enemy’s strategy and structure. While I believe the latter. Continuous use of so-called assessments has given us a false picture our enemy’s purpose and strategy. As a result, we have taken far too long to formulate an effective strategy of our own. Consequently, we are further prolonging what is correctly referred to as the “long war”. It’s time we think critically about how we view this enemy and begin constructing a long-term strategy in addition to a long-term operational plan and sound and successful tactics. Too many analysts, political leaders and others profess to be adept at critical thinking. In fact, most of us are not. The phrase “critical thinking” has become the latest addition to our pseudo-intellectual lexicon incubator. Critical thinking demands the rare ability to truly consider or accept a different perception of an event, a result, or a phenomenon. Most of the time biases get in the way. This is true whether we are making daily decisions impacting only ourselves or whether we are political, military or corporate leaders affecting the strategic goals of our organizations or our country. Unfortunately, this is true for those who have formulated US and allied strategy against the global terrorist threat since 2001. The attack on September 11 was not only a watershed day for the US and its allies, but also for the terrorist movement. Every day we see headlines that proclaim ISIS is on the run; AQ’s core has been decimated; the goal of the Caliphate has been destroyed; we are defeating the enemy. We have heard these assessments for years. Those who have done a little research and applied critical thinking to the issue know these statements are not true. So, we either have leaders, decision makers and policy makers who have not looked at our strategy critically or they have another reason to make sure people believe past policies and strategies have been and continue to be appropriate for success. Either way we continue to lose. Our adversary in terror is not a junior varsity team who is being defeated. They are and have been, since 9/11 adaptable with clear objectives and an effective strategy. Many who have made these sanguine statements of our enemy’s demise have confined their vision of success to military solutions and military objectives. Evaluating success from this myopic view has been successful in past wars and it creates a victorious environment that is easily understood by most of our population where victories measured in the liberation of territory. These measures are clear to combatants and our general population. That is not to say that military victories are not necessary in this fight but this is a war with theaters and fronts that require us to view our enemy differently. The military operations that resulted in liberating Raqqa and other ISIS strongholds needs to be heralded. But dangers in a premature celebration remain. Attacks like those in Orlando, Madrid, Paris and London continue and will continue until we consider our view of the adversary differently and adjust our national and allied strategy accordingly. “Military victories that are not translated into political ones are useless.” Abu-Musab Al-Suri In 2005, with the guidance of a trusted colleague, I studied a translation of a manifesto written by Abu Musab Al-Suri (the Syrian) and it changed the way I viewed this war. My friend and colleague’s study of the document in the original Arabic provided the cultural and literary insights that fostered the critical thinking necessary to see the terrorist structure morph into Al-Suri’s vision of a system that is hard for the Western mind to understand. That has led to a failure to construct a long term offensive focused strategy. Add to that the West’s political and cultural reluctance for an all-out effort to defeat our enemy, and we have the confluence of events that can only lead to perpetual conflict. Victor Davis Hanson has written an excellent article about prolonged wars “Why do these Wars Never End”. In a summation, he states, referring to our enemy “By design, they seek to involve the United States in conflict on their terms. September 11 aside, they seek to avoid posing a perceived existential threat that might provoke an infuriated American public, fueled with the military power to finish any war they enter”. Which is precisely the view Al Suri advocates. Recently, Al-Suri’s writings and internet lectures are being extolled. In some publications, he is being called a leading strategist for the Mujahedeen and his influence is growing. In the course of the 1600 or so pages of his manifesto, he charts a strategy for a jihadist victory. In his writings, he states that he wanted to create, not an organization, but a system. One that, even if we understand it, we will not be able to defeat it. A bold claim that has proven to be prophetic. Volumes have been written trying to find solutions to the spread and success of the Jihadist propaganda themes, messages, recruitment to above all, to stop the attacks. Many of these attempts are well thought out but focus on presenting a bifurcated either/or solution (e.g. military vs humanitarian) or they labor so hard to achieve political correctness that their intended impact declines to verbal disorder and flaccid phrases. Most of these attempts, at their best, focus on countering ideological arguments and justifying tactical failures rather than providing offensive operations that include information and political elements as well as military solutions. Too many times, we in the West, witness a violent atrocity and expect immediate answers and solutions. Paraphrasing Dr. Morris Massey, a sociologist and behavioral expert, we are a culture that expects solutions to problems in a one-hour TV show, with four commercial breaks regardless of the problem’s complexity. (That of course was before we had the capability to fast forward through commercials or delete them altogether.) If we are wise enough to open our minds and think critically, it is easy to see that our adversary is telling us how they fight and why. Most often it is not what our leaders or our media tells us. When we accept the validity of their how and why, then we can then see their vulnerabilities and we can successfully craft our own successful offensive strategy rather than looking for the quick short-term solutions. There was a pivot point for AQ and that was a result of Bin Laden’s decision to approve the 9/11 attack which he and AQ called the “Battle of Manhattan”. Al-Suri proclaimed the attack almost ended the movement. It wasn’t the attack itself that was a mistake but rather the “timing and the AQ structure and processes that left the movement vulnerable”. He clearly saw that the AQ organization as it was (a hierarchal organization) could not engage and defeat the United States. AQ just not compete. It needed a structural and strategic change. He saw the change as more than just a decentralization of authority. He called the new structure or process a system where those involved in the fight are:
self-radicalized
self-financed
self-organized
self-directed
He called these fighters the fourth-generation Mujahedeen who would be trained and educated on the internet. Importantly, he called for a deliberate and a very different two-front strategy. Different from our traditional thinking of geographical theaters of war, his solution rests on two seemingly divergent but dependent processes and systems. (Specifics about his call for “open fronts” and elements that operate “behind enemy lines” will be discussed in detail in subsequent articles.) Because of our long adherence to the hierarchal organization and influences of Fredrick Taylor, Eliot Jacques, Robert Michaels and the successes of elite theory, Al-Suri’s vision of a system is difficult for us to grasp. Hierarchal organizations have thrived because by nature they reduce individual tasks to their simplest form and improve communication through strict organizational processes resulting in the accumulation of knowledge that resides only with the leadership elite. The leaders are the only ones who have a total view of the organization and have exclusive authority to direct assets that solve problems or implement strategy. Most of us think, for one reason or another that this is the only way an organization or entity can function successfully. But that kind of organization was designed when communication was difficult inside and especially outside of the structure. Things have changed but Western management theory is hard to replace simply because it has indeed worked for so long. Al-Suri’s theory turns the hierarchy of the traditional organization upside down. So why is Al Suri able to be right now, in our time? Just as Martin Luther’s movement could not have been successful without the invention of the printing press and the resultant rapid and blanket dissemination of his 95 Theses, this upside-down view of a functioning entity could not be successful without the rapid and unrestricted flow of information to a broad spectrum of people. All made possible by the internet. Because of the availability and speed which information now flows, Al-Suri’s strategy turns our current view of organizational effectiveness on its head. That includes influences on the battlefield as well as political positions and economic attitudes.
Many have called our enemy’s effort a leaderless or decentralized organization. Some have even minimized the terrorist effort as nothing more than a traditional organization with relaxed rules of engagement. But it is more than that.
Start with an organization chart turned upside down where the role of the leader is no longer conditional on retaining all knowledge. The role of the leader in this system is not to direct activity, issue orders, ensure strict procedures are followed or ensure reports of progress flow back so new direction can be given. The role of the leader in this upside-down system is to issue guidance rooted in the movements strategy, its objectives and its ideology. This structure acknowledges that information cannot be held with just a few of the structure’s elite. Access to information and phenomenon like crowd sourcing and open innovation become force multipliers in our enemy’s tactics.
One final point about what makes our enemy’s system work. There is a distinct and deliberate blueprint to achieve unity of effort. It is important here to separate unity of effort from unity of command. Al Suri makes the point that in places where there is open conflict like Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Sudan, fighters must obey the command of the combatant leader. But for the movement as a whole and that encompasses the cells behind enemy lines, control is implemented by issuing guidance adheres to three elements. These are enduring and the only elements that bind the entire system.
The movement has a common name and exists under a common banner.
It seems that our enemy understands the importance of naming things and symbolically presenting that name under a common banner in this case a black flag. While variations of the flag appear globally, the black theme remains. Some say the source is a Hadith describing the coming apocalypse, that states “Black standards will come from Khorasan, nothing shall turn them back until they are planted in Jerusalem.” Others have questioned this Hadith as weak. Regardless of the view it serves the purpose of providing an image of unity.
The movement has a common ideological program.
The ideology professed is theological, indeed monotheistic, with political implications.
The movement has common objectives.
Primary among them is to resist and repel the invaders and allies through jihad to achieve God’s rules. This also includes avenging the actions of the invaders and their allies. There is an argument to be made there is the objective to reintroduce Islam as a way of life to employ effectively a nation’s human and financial resources to their full potential. Thirdly, to provoke a clash between Islam and the West and further drive wedges into these divisions to expand power and influence.
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the Emir of AQ issued a statement that called for all elements of the movement to unite in the struggle in Syria. It is at least the second such plea for unity he has issued since 2015. Much of the reporting interprets this as a sign that terrorist organizations, especially AQ and ISIS are dying and that this is a desperate effort to consolidate power after ISIS battlefield losses. But what if it is not? What if, as the Emir, he is implementing the principles set out by Al-Suri and he is issuing guidance to those who fight under a common banner and ideology to achieve a common objective? It is a generally held belief that Zawahiri is not a believer in Al-Suri’s viewpoints. But even if that is true and he wants to consolidate power for himself, he at least recognizes some of the guiding principles set by Al-Suri.
Al-Suri’s lessons have created an entity that is really difficult for us in the United States and the West to understand. Theirs is an entity that successfully attacks our vulnerabilities and exacerbates and exploits our divisions. It is an entity that is adaptable and is without question, wide-spread. There is a growing number of military and civilians in our government and our general population who are beginning to understand the structure, processes and system we are up against. But the numbers are small and our voices even smaller and do not reside at high enough levels of influence. Subsequent articles will examine these and other elements of our adversary’s strategy and discuss how it can be translated into vulnerabilities.
But that is another story.